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Abstract. Kinderman (2005) presented a psychological model of mental disorder, based on a
critique and reformulation of the biopsychosocial model. Kinderman suggested that disruption
or dysfunction in psychological processes is a final common pathway in the development
of mental disorder. These processes include, but are not limited to, cognitive processes. This
‘mediating psychological processes model’ proposes that biological and environmental factors,
together with a person’s personal experiences, lead to mental disorder through their conjoint
effects on these psychological processes. The clinical implications of this model are discussed
further here. It is proposed that formulations rather than diagnoses should predominate clinical
planning, that these formulations should detail the hypothesised disruption to psychological
processes or mechanisms, that psychological therapies should receive higher priority, and that
medical, social and even psychological interventions are most likely to be clinically effective
if they are designed on the basis of their likely beneficial impact on underlying psychological
mechanisms.
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Introduction
Many recent reports by professional bodies, strategy documents from policy makers and
proposed changes in legislation emphasize the role of psychologists and of psychological
perspectives in mental health. The first clinical guideline issued by the UK’s National Institute
for Clinical Excellence concerned the treatment of schizophrenia, and recommended that
“100%” of people in receipt of the diagnosis of schizophrenia should be offered cognitive
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Figure 1. The central role of psychological processes
behavioural therapy (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2002) (p. 55). Recent academic
reviews have emphasized the role of psychosocial influences on mental illnesses and psychotic
experiences (British Psychological Society Division of Clinical Psychology, 2000) and major
grant-funded randomized controlled trials have repeatedly demonstrated the effectiveness of
psychological therapeutic approaches in a range of mental health problems (Department of
Health, 2001; Nathan and Gorman, 1998; Lambert, 2001).
Until very recently, the most appropriate conceptual framework for accommodating
such factors into a predominately medical healthcare structure has been George Engel’s
biopsychosocial model (Engel, 1980). The biopsychosocial model located mental disorder
within a human system that has both physical elements (a biological nervous system) and
psychosocial elements (relationships, family, community and wider society) (Ghaemi, 2003).
Although the biopsychosocial model has been widely advocated (Goldberg and Huxley, 1992;
Falloon and Fadden, 1993; Brown and Harris, 1978; Department of Health, 2004a), take-
up by clinical psychiatrists has been patchy (Moncrieff and Crawford, 2001, Pilgrim and
Rogers, 2005; Read, 2005). The biopsychosocial model has also been criticised (Pilgrim,
2002; McLaren, 1998). Such criticism comes both from those who stress the benefits of a
more strongly biomedical model of mental disorder (Kandel, 1998; Roth and Kroll, 1986)
and from those who feel that the biopsychosocial model fails to challenge such biomedical
approaches (Ross and Pam, 1995; Rogers and Pilgrim, 1991; Breggin, 1993).
Kinderman (2005) took this further, suggesting that the biopsychosocial model fails to
address issues related to the different status and nature of the different elements – the unresolved
issue of “primacy” (Guze, 1989; Rashkis, 1979) – and that the nature of psychological
factors itself needed further attention. Kinderman suggested that, instead of assuming that
biological, social and psychological factors are co-equal partners in the aetiology of mental
disorder, disruption or dysfunction in psychological processes is a final common pathway
in the development of mental disorder. Kinderman’s “mediating psychological processes
model” proposes that biological and environmental factors, together with a person’s personal
experiences, lead to mental disorder through their conjoint effects on these psychological
processes. This psychological model of mental disorder is illustrated graphically in Figure 1.
In this model, biological abnormalities or physical insults are believed to lead to mental
disorder because those biological factors may adversely affect psychological processes.
Similarly, the mediating psychological processes model argues that social factors such
as poverty and social deprivation may lead to disillusionment, hopelessness and learned
helplessness; a realization that there is little or nothing that one can do to improve or change
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one’s lot in life, and perhaps even that one’s actions have no effect or purpose (Mal, Jain and
Yadav, 1990; Evans, Saltzman and Cooperman, 2001; Seligman, 1989). Finally, and of course
only a single example among many possible, Kinderman (2005) argued that circumstantial
factors and life events, such as childhood sexual, emotional or physical abuse, may lead to a
wide variety of mental disorder as a result of the impact on the ways in which the children
(and later the adults) appraise themselves, the important people in their lives, their actions and
the consequences of their actions, and the ways in which relationships and social intercourse
should be governed (their cognitive schemas) (Young, 1999).
Some commentators would suggest that the final common pathway in the development or
identification of mental disorder is social, not psychological (Coulter, 1973; Thoits, 1985).
This is a valid point, and Kinderman (2005) contributed to the long-standing debate between
competing models of mental disorder. A more detailed discussion of this issue, including a
more detailed discussion of the relationship between social and psychological factors in the
context of socioeconomic deprivation, can be found in Kinderman (2005). In part this paper
contributes to that debate, but is more specifically focused on the clinical implications of a
psychological model.
It is also more common for “models” within the cognitive psychology literature to include
considerable detail and specificity on the processes and mechanisms lying behind particular
disorders. In that context, it could be argued that the current paper presents a “framework”.
This, however, is derived from a fuller model (Kinderman, 2005), which discussed detailed
and specific psychological processes and mechanisms. That included extended discussion of
the importance of feedback loops – for example, the effects of childhood trauma on brain
development, or how cognitive factors such as expected reward (or punishment) may alter
physiological arousal.
Kinderman (2005) outlined a range of empirical research support for the mediating
psychological processes model; which is outside the scope of the present paper. There
is, however, considerable empirical evidence that psychological factors “add value” to
explanatory frameworks that otherwise focus on biological or social factors (Lewontin, Rose
and Kamin, 1984). Even in psychosis, explanatory models invoking psychological factors and
interventions have demonstrated considerable benefit (British Psychological Society Division
of Clinical Psychology, 2000). In terms of clinical impact, recent reviews of psychological
and drug treatments for depression and anxiety (Hollon, Stewart and Strunk, 2006) reveal that
psychological treatments convey specific and particular benefits, particularly in reducing the
risk of subsequent return of problems.
Kinderman (2005) briefly outlined some of the implications of such a model: for health
service policy, for research and for clinical practice. Necessarily, however, discussion of these
implications was limited. The current paper expands on the clinical implications of that model.
Diagnosis and formulation
The weakness, statistically and theoretically, of diagnosis has been discussed elsewhere
(Bentall, 2003). Psychiatric diagnosis can be unreliable (van Os et al., 1999), especially when
the ideal conditions for accurate and reliable diagnosis are absent (McGorry et al., 1995).
Diagnosis is also of doubtful validity, with incomplete consensus as to what the criteria for any
particular diagnosis are. The utility of psychiatric diagnoses is also limited; treatment based
on observed phenomena appears more effective than treatment based on diagnostic categories
(Moncrieff, 1997).
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Psychological classification. One possible conclusion might be to advocate a new
approach to classification, based not upon a theoretically neutral, phenomenological, approach
or indeed a biomedical approach, but rather on psychological principles. A plausible approach
could be to classify patients’ problems on the basis of the presence of identified dysfunctions
in psychological processes. Although plausible, such an approach is unviable.
First, the so-called symptoms of mental disorders themselves exist on continua with
normality (Bentall, 2003). Even psychotic experiences such as hallucinations and delusions
appear to be common in the so-called “normal” population (Tein, 1991; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl
and Ravelli, 2000; Poulton et al., 2000). It also appears that the measurable aspects of the
underlying psychological processes lie on continua. Personality traits – whatever one thinks
about their nature and significance – appear well distributed in the general population (Tillfors,
Furmark, Ekselius and Fredrikson, 2001; Lenzenweger and Korfine, 1992). Dysfunctional
beliefs of the kind integral to the cognitive models of a range of disorders appear to be
similarly common (Lester, 1993; Oliver and Baumgart, 1985). In short, there is considerable
evidence that the psychological processes integral to the mediating psychological processes
model of mental disorder are disturbed to a greater or lesser extent (or in subtly different ways)
in different people. It is not the case that some people possess intact psychological processes
and others possess dysfunctional psychological processes. Finally, psychological processes are
impinged upon by events. It is obvious that relevant psychological processes are changeable
and state dependent. For example, the induction of negative mood can lead to the activation
of dysfunctional (extreme and self-defeating) belief systems in vulnerable people (Mirander,
Gross, Persons and Hahn, 1998). In such an analysis any classificatory system, even one based
on psychology rather than biology, would be invalid.
In general, classificatory approaches fail adequately to reflect the multi-factorial basis of
mental disorder (van Os et al., 1999). Dimensional or “transdiagnostic” approaches (Harvey,
Watkins, Mansell and Shafran, 2004) attempt to reflect the fact that many disruptions or
dysfunctions of psychological processes – such as negative self appraisal or attentional biases –
are present across diagnoses. This approach has been used with people with panic disorder
and other co-morbid problems (Tsao, Mystkowski, Zucker and Craske, 2005). This suggests
that if the psychological processes implicated in panic disorder are successfully addressed,
then the other co-morbid problems also reduce in severity. Moreover, in contrast, attempts to
treat each disorder separately appear less effective.
This argument has a personal, ethical or even political element as well as a scientific one. The
positivist tradition of psychiatry has been criticized by some for its reliance on classification
and invocation of disease entities, becoming impersonal and reducing individual meaning
(Pilgrim and Rogers, 2005). In contrast, an approach based on psychological formulations has
been argued to be more inclusive and person-centred (British Psychological Society Division
of Clinical Psychology, 2000). This argument would extend to “psychological classification”.
It is likely that psychological categories of dysfunction, even if they were to escape the trap of
becoming classifications of people, would similarly tend to obscure the personal and dynamic
nature of human experience.
Psychological formulations. Mental health practitioners should instead use individual
clinical formulations. Psychological formulations sum and integrate the information acquired
through the assessment process (Hawton, Salkovskis, Kirk and Clark, 1989). Psychological
formulations attempt to explain why people are experiencing difficulties. They usually consist
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of a list of problems and hypotheses as to the possible psychological reasons for these (Persons,
1989). Formulations usually incorporate the events of people’s lives, and how the individuals
have interpreted and reacted to these. Formulations are hypotheses about the nature and origin
of problems, which are tested out over time (Brewin, 1988), and therefore tend to evolve over
the course of both assessment and therapy. Psychological case formulations are complex and
may commonly incorporate several hypotheses, based on a variety of psychological theories,
each drawing on scientific research.
The use of psychological formulations is not synonymous with being a clinical psychologist.
Many individual clinical psychologists may fail to provide psychological formulations. Many
medically trained psychiatrists welcome formulation; either as an adjunct to diagnosis – the
flawed but iconic DSM-IV suggests that diagnosis is only a start – or as an alternative to
diagnosis (Bracken and Thomas, 1998).
It is not necessary to invoke the mediating psychological processes model (Kinderman,
2005) of mental disorder in order to appreciate the benefits of clinical case formulations.
An argument for clinical case formulations can be built upon the unreliability of diagnostic
approaches and the benefits of the alternative. Indeed, formulations have been preferred to
simple diagnoses for many years, and were advocated by influential early psychiatrists such
as Meyer and Abraham. But the mediating psychological processes model does suggest the
nature of appropriate formulations.
Despite the central role given to formulation as a basis of the professional activity of clinical
psychologists (British Psychological Society Division of Clinical Psychology, 2001), relatively
little has been written on the subject in the academic literature. Beck and colleagues (Beck,
Rush, Shaw and Emery, 1979) discuss formulations from a cognitive therapy perspective in
terms of the, now ubiquitous, dysfunctional attitudes and negative automatic thoughts. In
terms of the mediating psychological processes model (Kinderman, 2005), however, it makes
scant and implicit reference to underlying cognitive processes of belief formation and what
might best be described as heuristic reasoning. Some mention is also made of behavioural
processes (activity scheduling is recommended as a therapeutic intervention in its own right in
addition to providing a stimulus for the discussion of cognition), but this is again implicit and
limited.
In the “five factor” model of formulation (Padesky and Greenberger, 1995), biological,
environmental, cognitive, behavioural and affective factors are all recommended for inclusion
in the clinician’s formulation. Psychological processes, other than those already addressed in
Beck’s approach, are not emphasized.
Persons (1989) offers the most straightforward framework for psychological case
formulation. This approach consists of a problem list (a description of the person’s
actual experiences or problems), provisional hypotheses concerning possible precipitants,
vulnerability and maintaining factors and protective factors (developed collaboratively
between client and therapist) and collaborative hypotheses concerning possible effective
interventions. Once again, psychological processes appear to have relatively lesser status.
The mediating psychological processes model (Kinderman, 2005) places psychological
processes – and the disruption to psychological processes – central in the formulation of mental
disorder. This implies a rather different approach than a focus on possible precipitants,
vulnerability and maintaining factors and protective factors. In this model, such elements are
seen as influencing mental health indirectly, through their impact on psychological processes.
This focus applies, initially, to the assessment process.
6 P. Kinderman and S. Tai
Assessment. Clinicians following the approach advocated here will change what they
assess and how assessment is conducted. Of course, there must be a basic or general assessment,
which will include a risk assessment. As in other approaches to psychological formulations,
the person’s problems should be assessed in detail, attending to specific phenomenological
elements, and with particular emphasis on behaviours, cognitions and affect (Beck et al.,
1979). However, these are particularly important in that they point to putative psychological
processes. Thus, while the first step must be a clear outline of the presenting problems, the
second, and crucial step in the formulation process is therefore is to identify the psychological
processes involved in the target phenomena.
It would be difficult, and probably inappropriate, to try to specify all of the assessments that
could be employed – it is clearly possible that any (and any combinations) of psychological
processes identified could be relevant for any individual. However, a reasonable assessment
may examine the processes of belief-formation and interpretation that shape the person’s
world-view. Thus both “core dysfunctional beliefs” (Beck et al., 1979) and “core dysfunctional
schemas” (Young, 1999) may be the subject of evaluation, leading to examination of the
person’s appraisal of and beliefs about the self.
Such an assessment may lead from beliefs to attributions – causal attributions are important
evaluative processes that have been linked to a range of psychological problems (Brewin, 1985;
Kinderman and Bentall, 1997). Assessment of the patient’s appraisals of events (attributions)
may lead to an assessment of the patient’s understanding of the psychological problems
themselves; from identification and appraisal of internal states (Pallant, 2000) to health beliefs
as they apply to psychological problems (Lobban, Barrowclough and Jones, 2003). This is
likely to lead to an assessment of possible problems with processes of metacognition (Wells,
2003).
If, for instance, a person were to identify depressed mood in their problem list, a formulating
clinician should investigate processes of self-esteem maintenance (Brown, Bifulco and
Andrews, 1990), learned helplessness and self-efficacy (Mal et al., 1990; Evans, Saltzman and
Cooperman, 2001; Seligman, 1989) and the extensive literature on negative cognitive schemas
(Beck et al., 1979; Kumari and Blackburn, 1992). These latter considerations should extend to
interpersonal schemas (Young, 1999). Of course, similar considerations must apply in respect
to other identified problems – the presence of auditory hallucinations a problem list would
suggest assessment of the possible involvement of processes of misattribution of inner thought
or inner speech (Rankin and O’Carroll, 1995) and secondary appraisal of psychotic phenomena
(Morrison and Haddock, 1997), the presence of delusions would lead to an appraisal of biases
in causal attribution (Kinderman and Bentall, 1997) and “jumping to conclusions” (Huq,
Garety and Hemsley, 1988; Dudley, John, Young and Over, 1997) and so on.
In addition to possible differences in the variables assessed, in the model presented here,
differences may emerge in the reasons for or purpose of assessment. Assessment is not intended
to identify abnormal processes for the purposes of classification, nor to identify some notion of
internal “badness”. Rather, it is believed that all people, including people with psychological
problems, use a range of psychological processes to make sense of the world (Bentall, 2003),
Distress and disorder, in Kinderman’s model, emerges not from abnormal process per se,
but from dysfunction of these normal processes. This distinction alters our conceptualization
within clinical practice.
This approach to formulation contrasts with that advocated by psychologists with specialist
interests in particular forms of therapy – such as CBT. In such approaches a general assessment
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is typically followed by assessments exploring the one particular set of processes associated
with that form of therapy. Thus, CBT practitioners assess core beliefs and negative automatic
thoughts, behavioural therapists explore patterns of contingent reinforcement etc. In the
mediating psychological processes approach, assessment may be much broader and more
eclectic. This places some demands on the practitioner for greater erudition and a wider
set of competencies, but also allows for a more comprehensive assessment process. The
mediating psychological processes model (Kinderman, 2005) also allows for this broad set
of possible assessments to be placed in a coherent framework. What sets this model apart is
that such assessments have a clear and specific aim – the identification of the disruptions to or
dysfunctions of psychological process.
Disruption to psychological processes or mechanisms
Central to Kinderman’s model (Kinderman, 2005) is the idea that disruption or dysfunction in
psychological processes is a final common pathway in the development of mental disorder. The
model proposes that biological and environmental factors, together with a person’s personal
experiences, lead to mental disorder through their conjoint effects on these psychological
processes. Clearly, then, formulations should focus on these processes.
The third step in a framework of formulation based on the mediating psychological processes
model (Kinderman, 2005) is therefore to examine the possible contributory role of biological,
social and circumstantial factors in the disruption of these processes. This serves to clarify
the steps taken in Persons’ approach of identifying possible precipitants and vulnerability,
maintaining and protective factors (Persons, 1989). Thus, in terms of precipitants, the mediating
psychological processes model necessitates examining what circumstantial factors might
have precipitated any identified disruptions in psychological processes. More interestingly,
vulnerability factors, maintaining factors and protective factors should be considered in the
framework of biological, social and circumstantial elements, as well as in how these factors
might have impacted on the key psychological processes.
The difference between identifying vulnerability factors for an identified problem (as
in the Persons approach) and identifying social factors that might pose a vulnerability
for the disruption of specific psychological processes (as the mediating psychological
processes approach would imply) is subtle but important. The mediating psychological
processes model (Kinderman, 2005) made clear that the relationship between biological,
social and circumstantial elements and the mental disorder per se is mediated by disruption of
psychological processes. Identification of vulnerability factors for identified problems directly,
then, misses out on the crucially important mediating variables. But placing greater emphasis on
this element – the disrupted or disturbed psychological processes themselves – the explanatory
framework is strengthened; just as a path analysis that takes proper account of mediating
variables explains more variance.
In the case of depressed mood, factors such as monoamine abnormalities (Charney, 1998)
social disadvantage (Reijneveld and Schene, 1998) and sexual, emotional or physical abuse
(Mueser, Rosenberg, Goodman and Trumbetta, 2002) would be considered, but these would
be examined in more forensic detail, exploring how these factors impact on representations of
behavioural contingencies or on interpersonal cognitive schemas. Similar considerations might
examine dopaminergic abnormalities, central executive dysfunction, or adverse childhood
events in the case of hallucinations and delusions (Bentall, 2003).
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The mediating psychological processes approach (Kinderman, 2005), of course, is not
limited to cognitive processes. Behavioural mechanisms such as learned helplessness (Mal
et al., 1990; Evans et al., 2001; Seligman, 1989) and classical conditioning (Dadds, Davey and
Field, 2001), and interventions such as systematic desensitization (King, Muris and Ollendick,
2005), activity scheduling (Beck et al., 1979) and behavioural experiments (Bennett-Levy
et al., 2004), and psychodynamic factors such as the role of family processes (Lopez et al.,
2004) and relationships with formal and informal carers (Ryan, 2002) can be integrated into
the formulation.
Psychological imperialism versus integration
Kinderman (2005) makes a confident, even bullish defence of a psychological model of mental
disorder. The recent interest in CBT as an intervention and in psychological approaches
more generally means that claims for a psychological model are “flavour of the month”.
This need not lead to psychologists becoming dogmatic and “imperialist” – psychological
orthodoxies come and go, and many psychological practitioners are relatively detached from
academic psychological science (Cheshire and Pilgrim, 2004). This means that advocates of
psychological models should be cautious and open-minded. Psychology does not claim to be
able to explain everything and solve any problem, but it may be helpful.
One clear practical implication of Kinderman’s (2005) model to clinical practice is that it
offers a coherent framework for integrating various psychological approaches. It can also link
such psychological approaches with other professional perspectives. While multidisciplinary
working in mental health care is strongly and widely welcomed (National Institute of Mental
Health in England and Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2004), eclecticism in psychological
therapies is often viewed with scepticism (Markotwitz, 2005; Lazarus, 1995). In the mediating
psychological processes model, however, it is entirely appropriate to develop integrative
formulations that allow psychological processes to be understood directly – rather than as
components of any specific approach. Thus it is entirely appropriate to invoke models of
dysfunction in behavioural processes (such as learned contingencies of reinforcement), and, at
the same time, incorporate models of abnormalities in cognitive processes such as attribution
and belief-formation and psychodynamic models. Perhaps most importantly, the mediating
psychological processes model (Kinderman, 2005) explicitly states that such a variety of
psychological processes should be integrated with an understanding of social circumstances
and biological factors, and the impact of these variables on the psychological issues. This
approach, therefore, offers an opportunity to develop truly eclectic, multidisciplinary and
systemic formulations that are nevertheless theoretically valid and coherent. Of course, the
end-point of formulation is intervention. Again, the mediating psychological processes model
can offer important guidance to clinicians.
This fundamentally integrative approach, flowing from the mediating psychological
processes model (Kinderman, 2005), differs substantially from more traditional approaches.
Not only does this approach allow different psychological traditions to be integrated, but it
allows integration of biological, social and psychological approaches. It is not uncommon,
even in otherwise well-integrated multi-disciplinary teams, for different approaches to the
understanding of mental disorder to be (as it were) on different tracks – with medial-
style diagnosis paralleling psychological formulation, and the prescription of psychoactive
medication accompanying psychological and social therapies. The mediating psychological
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processes model (Kinderman, 2005) allows these potentially parallel tracks to converge.
What sets this model apart is that the formulations are designed around the central notion
of disruptions to or dysfunctions of psychological process.
This approach also has additional, significant, implications for service design (Kinderman,
2005). In addition, inevitably, to increasing the emphasis on psychological competencies in
mental health services, those services themselves should be designed in a manner that permits
and facilitates such approaches. This will involve addressing the needs of the workforce (from
recruitment, through training and continuing professional development to clinical supervision)
the managerial structure of services (how referrals are processed, how clinical decisions are
made, the “hierarchy” of professional decision-making etc) and even the place of mental health
care in the health services – should the care of people in personal distress even be a matter
for “health” services? These issues were addressed briefly in the original exposition of the
mediating psychological processes model (Kinderman, 2005).
Interventions
The most significant implication of this psychological model in respect to interventions
for mental disorder is to advocate a more central role for psychological therapies. Since
psychological processes are a central feature, a final common pathway, in the genesis of
mental disorder, it clearly makes sense to provide the opportunity for direct psychological
intervention. This is not, in itself, too radical. In the UK (Department of Health, 2004b)
the Department of Health is proposing a major investment in the provision of psychological
therapies, and the plans for the development of competencies in a range of professions include
the aspirations that a wide range of staff will, in the future, provide such psychotherapy.
One implication of this model of mental disorder for clinical practice is that more time may
be spent with patients developing collaborative explanatory models. Building such frameworks
for understanding their difficulties, using this model, would in itself be an intervention. There
is a danger that, in conventional approaches – whether psychiatric or psychological or other –
people experiencing distress could be offered particular frameworks of understanding (for
instance models of “illness”, or models based on the presence of negative automatic thoughts,
or interpersonal conflicts) as possible prototypes for helping to make sense of their experiences.
The danger here is two-fold. First, offering a series of choices between clinical explanations
is clearly imperfect. Second, the clinical decision-making may degenerate into a question as
to whether, for example, a diagnosis can be made, or whether negative automatic thoughts can
be identified.
It is likely, following this model, that normalization will be facilitated. Thus, people
experiencing distress should find that it is relatively easier to appreciate simultaneously that
their difficulties may arise from identifiable dysfunction (i.e. that there is something “wrong”
and that it is explicable, identifiable and understandable) but also that the disruption to their
psychological processes is normal and there are things they can do to recover. This point is
a fine one, but an important one. There is, within this model, a clear difference in meaning
between an abnormality per se (the medical model) and the emergence of problems following
the dysfunction of a set of normal psychological processes. That is, this model does not
necessitate the involvement of a new, different, process (an illness or disease process) but
rather suggests that normal processes, present in all people, can occasionally be disrupted or
malfunction.
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This framework of understanding is closely related to the concept of recovery (Ralph and
Corrigan, 2005). Rather than curing diseases, this model suggests that recovery involves
recognizing and ameliorating the disruptions and dysfunctions in process.
As mentioned above, the mediating psychological processes model (Kinderman, 2005)
explicitly supports eclectic, multidisciplinary and systemic formulations that are nevertheless
theoretically valid and coherent. This will support theoretically coherent eclectic intervention.
It is, in accordance with this model, entirely appropriate to use behavioural interventions to
address dysfunctions in behavioural processes (such as learned contingencies of reinforcement)
and, at the same time, employ techniques from cognitive therapy that effectively address
abnormalities in cognitive processes such as attribution and belief-formation. And none of
this is inconsistent with also exploring the possible benefits of prescribing antidepressant
medication and addressing a person’s social circumstances. This should support increased
(and more effective) multi-disciplinary working, and help to erode the distinctions between
different traditions of psychotherapy (behavioural, clinical and psychodynamic) and indeed
distinctions between different disciplines of psychologist (counselling, clinical, forensic).
The mediating psychological processes model (Kinderman, 2005) differs significantly from
the status quo in respect to therapeutic interventions. It is true that, at present and in itself, it does
not suggest a specific and unique therapy. That is, behavioural therapies are incorporated, as
are cognitive therapies and psychodynamic therapies. Moreover, the mediating psychological
processes model is entirely open to the incorporation of social and physical (pharmacological)
therapies. Within this model, however, such therapies have a clear and specific aim – the
amelioration of the disruptions to or dysfunctions of psychological process identified through
the assessment and formulation procedures.
Concluding summary
Kinderman’s (2005) mediating psychological processes model of mental disorder offers a
coherent account of the role of dysfunctions in psychological processes in the genesis of mental
disorder. This model has clear implications for clinical practice. Rather than invoking single
theoretical approaches, the mediating psychological processes model suggests that a wide
range of different psychological processes must be considered. Assessment, case formulation
and intervention, therefore, will necessarily be broad and eclectic.
Clearly, any model of mental disorder that places disruption or dysfunction of psychological
processes central will also place greater emphasis on psychological therapies. In this case,
however, a slightly different emphasis is also placed on social and pharmacological therapies.
In the mediating psychological processes model, such therapies are hypothesized to have their
effects through the impact on psychological processes. This may affect the therapeutic choices
made.
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